NEW YORK ACCOUNTABILITY COALITIONHow we defined the race early, drew the contrast, and kept working people with Tom.
NEW YORK ACCOUNTABILITY COALITIONHow we defined the race early, drew the contrast, and kept working people with Tom.
of the statewide Democratic primary vote came from New York City.
Outside the city it wasn’t a contest. DiNapoli took roughly 72% across suburbs and upstate.
Paid spending was highest in NYC across every campaign and IE — that’s where the race was won and lost.
Up and down the ballot, insurgents took down the establishment. Tom was the exception — because we set the terms of the race early.
In a night that punished the establishment across the board, Tom finished on top — and finished it by 9:01 PM.
Tom needed help — he was a vulnerable incumbent facing not one but two primary challengers who could potentially double-team attacking Tom early in the race.
We rule out 1 and 2, then weigh 3 and 4.

If progressive surge voters had turned out and skipped Comptroller, dropoff would rise in the most progressive precincts.
It does the opposite: dropoff falls from ~17% to ~7%. The most progressive voters completed the race at the highest rates and still chose DiNapoli.

Combined, the two progressives out-polled DiNapoli in the most progressive precincts (65% to 34%).
But a split only matters where the winner falls short of a majority. DiNapoli cleared 50%+ in NY-10 and NY-13. Only NY-07 turned on the split.

The challengers had the resources — Goyle matched Tom ($3.1M) and outspent him on comms; Warshaw spent $2.4M. Drew and Raj had the money; their message failed to land.
Stacked on top of Tom’s $2.0M in campaign comms, our IE closed the gap and put him on top.

Drew and Raj weren’t invisible — their combined share climbed from 25% to 65% as precincts got more progressive.
But they couldn’t close. Even in the most progressive precincts, a third of voters — theirs by ideology — stayed with DiNapoli.

A large share of these voters cast ballots for progressives and Tom — the same voters who powered Valdez, Lander, and Avila Chevalier stayed with Tom for Comptroller.
This was the plan we outlined in memos from the start — strategic knowledge, not hindsight.
Launch in April to define the race — forcing opponents into a difficult strategic dilemma and preserving Tom's ability to keep his powder dry.
Own the attack on Warshaw & Goyle so Tom's own campaign could stay positive. Our strategic assumption was Tom wouldn't go negative — so we did.
Mamdani surge voters — unengaged before the last year — were likely to turn out strong for whoever was furthest left. We had to plan targeting and messaging so that surge didn't drag Tom's number down in the contested congressional districts.
This was not a broadcast campaign. This was a targeted social, digital, and streaming TV campaign aimed at the 16% of registered Democrats who would decide this election.
These three audience segments combined for a total of 966,911 voters — just 16% of registered Democrats in the state. Total votes cast for Comptroller: 879,689.
“He is taking retirement funds very seriously and protecting people’s money.”
Source: NYAC AIMI research, Spring 2026.
Hearing directly from the nurses, firefighters, and public workers whose retirements Tom protects moved the message from politics to trust — and elevated his credibility with primary voters.



Going early forced Warshaw to open his checkbook from the jump. He rushed this ad to air — it was his big TV spend, and it didn’t land with voters. It set the tone for the rest of his campaign.
Drew Warshaw’s launch spot
YouTube · April 30
NYAC set the tempo of the race — opponents reacted to us.
Source: linear TV spend for the three hard-side campaigns as reported to the New York State Board of Elections; NYAC IE spend per internal streaming TV records. Hard-side totals reflect linear TV only and do not include digital or other paid media.
Wealthy political insider benefiting from privilege and elite political connections.
GOP-aligned history in Kansas. Voted with Republicans 80% of the time. Opportunistic.
Hitting either opponent alone simply pushed voters to the other — but drawing the contrast against both together moved them to Tom.
Tom was the only candidate being attacked.
We leveled the field by surfacing our opponents’ records, so Tom could stay positive.
“I learned that there are two pseudo-progressives running.”
We anticipated higher turnout in DSA-aligned congressional districts and concentrated spend there so the Raj & Drew contrast reached the voters most at risk of drifting.


Source: NYAC program spend by district, all flights combined.
We raised and spent expecting late attacks that never fully came. A few variables cut for us — and a few didn’t materialize against us.
Opponents had negatives on Tom that our polling showed as effective — especially Palantir and ICE. They never put paid behind them. We can’t explain why.


















